Progressive Calendar 02.04.08 | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
From: David Shove (shove001![]() |
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Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2008 02:53:58 -0800 (PST) |
P R O G R E S S I V E C A L E N D A R 02.04.08 1. 9-11 misreport 2.04 8pm 2. Aeon housing 2.05 7:30am 3. Somali 2.05 8:30am 4. Journalism/CTV 2.05 5pm 5. Abortion doctor 2.05 7:30pm 6. William Blum - Killing Hope: Indroduction (1986) 7. ed - Runneth (poem) 8. ed - FM Bush (bumpersticker) --------1 of 8-------- From: Lydia Howell <lhowell [at] visi.com> Subject: 9-11 misreport 2.04 8pm MON.FEB.4, 8 pm,FRESH AIR hosted by Terry Gross: Investigative journalist Philip Shenon on the missed evidence, ignored clues and political considerations that interfered with the 9/11 Commission's work. It's the subject of his new book, The Commission. 91.1 FM in the Twin Cities --------2 of 8-------- From: Jenny Johnson <JJohnson [at] aeonhomes.org> Subject: Aeon housing 2.05 7:30am Learn how Aeon is responding to the affordable housing shortage in the Twin Cities. Please join us for a 1-hour Building Dreams presentation. Minneapolis Session: February 5 at 7:30 am We are also happy to present Building Dreams at your organization, place of worship, or business. Space is limited, please register online at: http://www.aeonhomes.org/bd or call Jenny Johnson at 612-341-3148 x237 Aeon 1625 Park Ave Minneapolis, MN 55404 (612) 341-3148 www.aeonhomes.org <http://www.aeonhomes.org/> --------3 of 8-------- From: J. May <jmay [at] idlelion.net> Subject: Somali 2.05 8:30am Sheeko Wadaag/Sharing Stories: From Home Language to School Literacy with Somali Families Tuesday, February 5, 2008 8:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m. Minnesota Humanities Center, St. Paul CEU credits: 7 Lunch included This workshop has been designed especially for professionals who are working with Somali parents who are not yet literate in Somali and/or English to will improve their support of preliterate Somali families. Participants will learn about the Somali oral storytelling tradition; examine techniques for working with preliterate and low-literate adult students; discover research- and practice-based suggestions about how to work together with preliterate parents to support the emergent literacy skills of their children; and will explore resources for building language, story, and book skills with families. The workshop connects educators to existing language development resources and enhances educators' knowledge of oral traditions and the connections between language and culture. Presenters include: Said Salah Ahmed, Minneapolis Public Schools; educational consultants Marian Hassan, Angele Passe, and Patsy Vinogradov; and Kathleen Moriarty, Minnesota Humanities Center. Fee: $85. Includes materials, continental breakfast and lunch. https://secure.minnesotahumanities.org/secure/tiregister.phtml --------4 of 8w-------- From: Eric Angell <eric-angell [at] riseup.net> Subject: Journalism/CTV 2.05 5pm Esteemed St. Paul Neighborhood Network (SPNN 15) viewers: "Our World In Depth" cablecasts in St. Paul on Tuesday evenings at 5pm, after DemocracyNow!, and midnight and Wednesday mornings at 10am. All households with basic cable may watch. Tues, 2/5 and midnight and 2/6 10am "Life After Newspapers: Changes in Journalism: A Panel Perspective from Twin Cities Journalists". Short film: "EPIC 2015" about the future of media, plus panel discussion featuring experienced Twin Cities journalists: Brian Lambert, Steve Perry, Matt Thompson, Eric Black and Joel Kramer. --------5 of 8-------- From: david unowsky <david.unowsky [at] gmail.com> Subject: Abortion doctor 2.05 7:30pm Susan Wicklund discusses her book This Common Secret: My Journey as an Abortion Doctor (Public Affairs Books) 7:30 pm Tuesday, February 5 at Magers and Quinn Booksellers. One doctor's raw and riveting memoir, contrasting the headline-grabbing political rhetoric with the contours of her life, and the lives of her patients In This Common Secret Dr. Susan Wicklund chronicles her emotional and dramatic twenty-year career on the front lines of the abortion war. Growing up in working class, rural Wisconsin, Wicklund had her own painful abortion at a young age. It was not until she became a doctor that she realized how many women shared her ordeal of an unwanted pregnancy - and how hidden this common experience remains. This is the story of Susan's love for a profession that means listening to women and helping them through one of the most pivotal and controversial events in their lives. Hers is also a calling that means sleeping on planes and commuting between clinics in different states - and that requires her to wear a bulletproof vest and to carry a .38 caliber revolver. This is also the story of the women whom Susan serves, women whose options are increasingly limited. Through these intimate, complicated, and inspiring accounts, Wicklund reveals the truth about the women's clinics that anti-abortion activists portray as little more than slaughterhouses for the unborn. As we enter the most fevered political fight over abortion America has ever seen, this raw and powerful memoir shows us what is at stake. Susan Wicklund has worked in the field of women's reproductive health for more than twenty years. For much of that time she has been on the front lines of the abortion war, both as a doctor and as a spokeswoman for women's rights. She has been interviewed by numerous leading media outlets, including 60 Minutes and "Fresh Air." Alan Kesselheim is a full-time freelance writer from Bozeman, Montana. This Common Secret is his ninth book. For further information, contact: David Unowsky 612/822-4611 davidu [at] magersandquinn.com MAGERS AND QUINN BOOKSELLERS 3038 HENNEPIN AVENUE SOUTH MINNEAPOLIS MN 55408 612-822-4611 www.magersandquinn.com --------6 of 8-------- from the book Killing Hope (1986) by William Blum INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGINAL EDITION Our fear that communism might someday take over most of the world blinds us to the fact that anti-communism already has. -Michael Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse [This introduction is presented, with some modifications, as it appeared in 1986. At that time the Soviet Union still existed and the cold war was very much alive. It is presented here because it offers a concise history of the cold war and a background to understanding the impetus behind, and the nature of, the many American interventions throughout the world.] It was in the early days of the fighting in Vietnam that a Vietcong officer said to his American prisoner: "You were our heroes after the War. We read American books and saw American films, and a common phrase in those days was `to be as rich and as wise as an American'. What happened?"{1} An American might have been asked something similar by a Guatemalan, an Indonesian or a Cuban during the ten years previous, or by a Uruguayan, a Chilean or a Greek in the decade subsequent. The remarkable international goodwill and credibility enjoyed by the United States at the close of the Second World War was dissipated country by country, intervention by intervention. The opportunity to build the war-ravaged world anew, to lay the foundations for peace, prosperity and justice, collapsed under the awful weight of anti-communism. The weight had been accumulating for some time; indeed, since Day One of the Russian Revolution. By the summer of 1918 some 13,000 American troops could be found in the newly-born Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Two years and thousands of casualties later, the American troops left, having failed in their mission to "strangle at its birth" the Bolshevik state, as Winston Churchill put it.{2} The young Churchill was Great Britain's Minister for War and Air during this period. Increasingly, it was he who directed the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Allies (Great Britain, the US, France, Japan and several other nations) on the side of the counter-revolutionary "White Army". Years later, Churchill the historian was to record his views of this singular affair for posterity: Were they [the Allies] at war with Soviet Russia? Certainly not; but they shot Soviet Russians at sight. They stood as invaders on Russian soil. They armed the enemies of the Soviet Government. They blockaded its ports, and sunk its battleships. They earnestly desired and schemed its downfall. But war - shocking! Interference - shame! It was, they repeated, a matter of indifference to them how Russians settled their own internal affairs. They were impartial - Bang!{3} What was there about this Bolshevik Revolution that so alarmed the most powerful nations in the world? What drove them to invade a land whose soldiers had recently fought alongside them for over three years and suffered more casualties than any other country on either side of the World War? The Bolsheviks had had the audacity to make a separate peace with Germany in order to take leave of a war they regarded as imperialist and not in any way their war, and to try and rebuild a terribly weary and devastated Russia. But the Bolsheviks had displayed the far greater audacity of overthrowing a capitalist-feudal system and proclaiming the first socialist state in the history of the world. This was uppitiness writ incredibly large. This was the crime the Allies had to punish, the virus which had to be eradicated lest it spread to their own people. The invasion did not achieve its immediate purpose, but its consequences were nonetheless profound and persist to the present day. Professor D.F. Fleming, the Vanderbilt University historian of the cold war, has noted: For the American people the cosmic tragedy of the interventions in Russia does not exist, or it was an unimportant incident long forgotten. But for the Soviet peoples and their leaders the period was a time of endless killing, of looting and rapine, of plague and famine, of measureless suffering for scores of millions - an experience burned into the very soul of a nation, not to be forgotten for many generations, if ever. Also for many years the harsh Soviet regimentations could all be justified by fear that the capitalist powers would be back to finish the job. It is not strange that in his address in New York, September 17, 1959, Premier Khrushchev should remind us of the interventions, "the time you sent your troops to quell the revolution", as he put it.{4} In what could be taken as a portent of superpower insensitivity, a 1920 US War Department report reads: "This expedition affords one of the finest examples in history of honorable, unselfish dealings ... under very difficult circumstances to be helpful to a people struggling to achieve a new liberty." {5} History does not tell us what a Soviet Union, allowed to develop in a "normal" way of its own choosing, would look like today. We do know, however, the nature of a Soviet Union attacked in its cradle, raised alone in an extremely hostile world, and, when it managed to survive to adulthood, overrun by the Nazi war machine with the blessings of the Western powers. The resulting insecurities and fears have inevitably led to deformities of character not unlike that found in an individual raised in a similar life-threatening manner. We in the West are never allowed to forget the political shortcomings (real and alleged) of the Soviet Union; at the same time we are never reminded of the history which lies behind it. The anti-communist propaganda campaign began even earlier than the military intervention. Before the year 1918 was over, expressions in the vein of "Red Peril", "the Bolshevik assault on civilization", and "menace to world by Reds is seen" had become commonplace in the pages of the New York Times. During February and March 1919, a US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee held hearings before which many "Bolshevik horror stories" were presented. The character of some of the testimony can be gauged by the headline in the usually sedate Times of 12 February 1919. DESCRIBE HORRORS UNDER RED RULE. R.E. SIMONS AND W.W. WELSH TELL SENATORS OF BRUTALITIES OF BOLSHEVIKI - STRIP WOMEN IN STREETS - PEOPLE OF EVERY CLASS EXCEPT THE SCUM SUBJECTED TO VIOLENCE BY MOBS. Historian Frederick Lewis Schuman has written: "The net result of these hearings ... was to picture Soviet Russia as a kind of bedlam inhabited by abject slaves completely at the mercy of an organization of homicidal maniacs whose purpose was to destroy all traces of civilization and carry the nation back to barbarism."{6} Literally no story about the Bolsheviks was too contrived, too bizarre, too grotesque, or too perverted to be printed and widely believed - from women being nationalized to babies being eaten (as the early pagans believed the Christians guilty of devouring their children; the same was believed of the Jews in the Middle Ages). The story about women with all the lurid connotations of state property, compulsory marriage, "free love", etc. "was broadcasted over the country through a thousand channels," wrote Schuman, "and perhaps did more than anything else to stamp the Russian Communists in the minds of most American citizens as criminal perverts".{7} This tale continued to receive great currency even after the State Department was obliged to announce that it was a fraud. (That the Soviets eat their babies was still being taught by the John Birch Society to its large audience at least as late as 1978.){8} By the end of 1919, when the defeat of the Allies and the White Army appeared likely, the New York Times treated its readers to headlines and stories such as the following: 30 Dec. 1919: "Reds Seek War With America" 9 Jan. 1920: "`Official quarters' describe the Bolshevist menace in the Middle East as ominous" 11 Jan. 1920: "Allied officials and diplomats [envisage] a possible invasion of Europe" 13 Jan. 1920: "Allied diplomatic circles" fear an invasion of Persia 16 Jan. 1920: A page-one headline, eight columns wide: "Britain Facing War With Reds, Calls Council In Paris." "Well-informed diplomats" expect both a military invasion of Europe and a Soviet advance into Eastern and Southern Asia. The following morning, however, we could read: "No War With Russia, Allies To Trade With Her" 7 Feb. 1920: "Reds Raising Army To Attack India" 11 Feb. 1920: "Fear That Bolsheviki Will Now Invade Japanese Territory" Readers of the New York Times were asked to believe that all these invasions were to come from a nation that was shattered as few nations in history have been; a nation still recovering from a horrendous world war; in extreme chaos from a fundamental social revolution that was barely off the ground; engaged in a brutal civil war against forces backed by the major powers of the world; its industries, never advanced to begin with, in a shambles; and the country in the throes of a famine that was to leave many millions dead before it subsided. In 1920, The New Republic magazine presented a lengthy analysis of the news coverage by the New York Times of the Russian Revolution and the intervention. Amongst much else, it observed that in the two years following the November 1917 revolution, the Times had stated no less than 91 times that "the Soviets were nearing their rope's end or actually had reached it."{9} If this was reality as presented by the United States' "newspaper of record", one can imagine only with dismay the witch's brew the rest of the nation's newspapers were feeding to their readers. This, then, was the American people's first experience of a new social phenomenon that had come upon the world, their introductory education about the Soviet Union and this thing called "communism". The students have never recovered from the lesson. Neither has the Soviet Union. The military intervention came to an end but, with the sole and partial exception of the Second World War period, the propaganda offensive has never let up. In 1943 Life magazine devoted an entire issue in honor of the Soviet Union's accomplishments, going far beyond what was demanded by the need for wartime solidarity, going so far as to call Lenin "perhaps the greatest man of modern times".{10} Two years later, however, with Harry Truman sitting in the White House, such fraternity had no chance of surviving. Truman, after all, was the man who, the day after the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, said: "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious in any circumstance."{11} Much propaganda mileage has been squeezed out of the Soviet-German treaty of 1939, made possible only by entirely ignoring the fact that the Russians were forced into the pact by the repeated refusal of the Western powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain, to unite with Moscow in a stand against Hitler;{12} as they likewise refused to come to the aid of the socialist-oriented Spanish government under siege by the German, Italian and Spanish fascists, and even sold arms to Hitler and Mussolini.. >From the Red Scare of the 1920s to the McCarthyism of the 1950s to the Reagan Crusade against the Evil Empire of the 1980s, the American people have been subjected to a relentless anti-communist indoctrination. It is imbibed with their mother's milk, pictured in their comic books, spelled out in their school books; their daily paper offers them headlines that tell them all they need to know; ministers find sermons in it, politicians are elected with it, and Reader's Digest becomes rich on it. The fiercely-held conviction inevitably produced by this insidious assault upon the intellect is that a great damnation has been unleashed upon the world, possibly by the devil himself, but in the form of people; people not motivated by the same needs, fears, emotions, and personal morality that govern others of the species, but people engaged in an extremely clever, monolithic, international conspiracy dedicated to taking over the world and enslaving it; for reasons not always clear perhaps, but evil needs no motivation save evil itself. Moreover, any appearance or claim by these people to be rational human beings seeking a better kind of world or society is a sham, a cover-up, to delude others, and proof only of their cleverness; the repression and cruelties which have taken place in the Soviet Union are forever proof of the bankruptcy of virtue and the evil intentions of these people in whichever country they may be found, under whatever name they may call themselves: and, most important of all, the only choice open to anyone in the United States is between the American Way of Life and the Soviet Way of Life, that nothing lies between or beyond these two ways of making the world. This is how it looks to the simple folk of America. One finds that the sophisticated, when probed slightly beneath the surface of their academic language, see it exactly the same way. And lest we think that such beliefs belong to an earlier, less enlightened period, it should be noted that in the fall of 1987, two years after Gorbachev, when a Gallup poll asked Americans whether they agreed that "There is an international Communist conspiracy to rule the world", 60 percent replied in the affirmative; only 28 percent disagreed.{13) To the mind carefully brought to adulthood in the United States, the truths of anti-communism are self-evident, as self-evident as the flatness of the world once was to an earlier mind; as the Russian people believed that the victims of Stalin's purges were truly guilty of treason. The foregoing slice of American history must be taken into account if one is to make sense of the vagaries of American foreign policy since the end of World War II, specifically the record, as presented in this book, of what the CIA and other branches of the US government have done to the peoples of the world. In 1918, the barons of American capital needed no reason for their war against communism other than the threat to their wealth and privilege, although their opposition was expressed in terms of moral indignation. During the period between the two world wars, US gunboat diplomacy operated in the Caribbean to make "The American Lake" safe for the fortunes of United Fruit and W.R. Grace & Co., at the same time warning of the Bolshevik threat to righteousness from the likes of Augusto Sandino. By the end of the Second World War, every American past the age of 40 had been subjected to some 25 years of anti-communist radiation, the average incubation period needed to produce a malignancy. Anti-communism had developed a life of its own, independent of its capitalist father. Increasingly, in the post-war period, middle-aged Washington policy makers and diplomats saw the world out there as one composed of "communists" and "anti-communists", whether of nations, movements or individuals. This comic-strip vision of the world, with American supermen fighting communist evil everywhere, had graduated from a cynical propaganda exercise to a moral imperative of US foreign policy. Even the concept of "non-communist", implying some measure of neutrality, has generally been accorded scant legitimacy in this paradigm. John Foster Dulles, one of the major architects of post-war US foreign policy, expressed this succinctly in his typically simple, moralistic way: "For us there are two sorts of people in the world: there are those who are Christians and support free enterprise and there are the others."{14} As several of the case studies in the present book confirm, Dulles put that creed into rigid practice. It is as true now as ever that American multinationals derive significant economic advantages from Third World countries due to their being under-industrialized, under-diversified, capitalist-oriented, and relatively powerless. It is equally true that the consequence of American interventions has frequently been to keep Third World countries in just such an underdeveloped, impotent state. There is thus at least a prima-facie case to be made for the contention that the engine of US foreign policy is still fueled predominantly by "economic imperialism". But that the consequence illuminates the intent does not necessarily follow. The argument that economic factors have continued to exert an important and direct influence upon United States interventionist policy in modern times does not stand up to close or "micro" examination. When all the known elements of the interventions are considered, scarcely any cases emerge which actually conform to the economic model, and even in these the stage is shared with other factors. The upshot in the great majority of cases is that tangible economic gain, existing or potential, did not, and could not, play a determining role in the American decision to intervene. The economic model proves woefully inadequate not only as a means of explanation, but even more so as a tool of prediction. In each of the most recent cases, for example - Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua - American intervention was foreseen and warned of well in advance simply, and only, because of the "communist" nature of the targets. But no one seriously suggested that some treasure lay in these impoverished lands luring the American pirates. Indeed, after the conquest and occupation of Grenada, the US business community displayed a marked indifference to setting up shop on the island, despite being implored to do so by Washington for political reasons. In other cases, where the American side failed to win a civil war, such as in China, Vietnam and Angola, Washington put up barriers to American corporations having any commercial dealings with the new regimes which were actually eager to do business with the United States. But this, as mentioned, is the "micro" way of looking at the question. One can just as legitimately approach it from a "macro" point of view. Seen from this perspective, one must examine the role of the military-industrial-intelligence complex. The members of this network need enemies - the military and the CIA because enemies are their raison d'tre, industry, specifically the defense contractors, because enemies are to be fought, with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and aircraft systems; enemies of our enemies are to be armed, to the teeth. It's made these corporations wealthier than many countries of the world; in one year the US spends on the military more than $17,000 per hour, for every hour since Jesus Christ was born. The executives of these corporations have long moved effortlessly through a revolving door between industry and government service, members in good standing of the good ol' boys club who continue to use their positions, their wealth, and their influence, along with a compliant and indispensable media, as we shall see, to nourish and perpetuate the fear of "communism, the enemy" now in its seventh decade and going strong. Given the nature and machinations of the military-industrial-intelligence complex, interventions against these enemies are inevitable, and, from the complex's point of view, highly desirable. In cases such as the above-mentioned Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, even if the particular target of intervention does not present an immediate lucrative economic opportunity for American multinationals, the target's socialist-revolutionary program and rhetoric does present a threat and a challenge which the United States has repeatedly felt obliged to stamp out, to maintain the principle, and as a warning to others; for what the US has always feared from the Third World is the emergence of a good example: a flourishing socialist society independent of Washington. Governments and movements with such programs and rhetoric are clearly not going to be cold-war allies, are clearly "communist", and thus are eminently credible candidates for the category of enemy. Inextricably bound up with these motivations is a far older seducer of men and nations, the lust for power: the acquisition, maintenance, use and enjoyment of influence and prestige; the incomparable elation that derives from molding the world in your own beloved image. In all these paradigms, "communist" is often no more than the name ascribed to those people who stand in the way of the realization of such ambitions (as "national security" is the name given for the reason for fighting "communists"). It is another twist of the old adage: if communists didn't exist, the United States would have to invent them. And so they have. The word "communist" (as well as "Marxist") has been so overused and so abused by American leaders and the media as to render it virtually meaningless. (The Left has done the same to the word "fascist".) But merely having a name for something - witches or flying saucers - attaches a certain credence to it. At the same time, the American public, as we have seen, has been soundly conditioned to react Pavlovianly to the term: it means, still, the worst excesses of Stalin, from wholesale purges to Siberian slave-labor camps; it means, as Michael Parenti has observed, that "Classic Marxist-Leninist predictions [concerning world revolution] are treated as statements of intent directing all present-day communist actions."{15} It means "us" against "them". And "them" can mean a peasant in the Philippines, a mural-painter in Nicaragua, a legally-elected prime minister in British Guiana, or a European intellectual, a Cambodian neutralist, an African nationalist - all, somehow, part of the same monolithic conspiracy; each, in some way, a threat to the American Way of Life; no land too small, too poor, or too far away to pose such a threat, the "communist threat". The cases presented in this book illustrate that it has been largely irrelevant whether the particular targets of intervention - be they individuals, political parties, movements or governments - called themselves "communist" or not. It has mattered little whether they were scholars of dialectical materialism or had never heard of Karl Marx; whether they were atheists or priests; whether a strong and influential Communist Party was in the picture or not; whether the government had come into being through violent revolution or peaceful elections ... all have been targets, all "communists". It has mattered still less that the Soviet KGB was in the picture. The assertion has been frequently voiced that the CIA carries out its dirty tricks largely in reaction to operations of the KGB which have been "even dirtier". This is a lie made out of whole cloth. There may be an isolated incident of such in the course of the CIA's life, but it has kept itself well hidden. The relationship between the two sinister agencies is marked by fraternization and respect for fellow professionals more than by hand-to-hand combat. Former CIA officer John Stockwell has written: Actually, at least in more routine operations, case officers most fear the US ambassador and his staff, then restrictive headquarters cables, then curious, gossipy neighbors in the local community, as potential threats to operations. Next would come the local police, then the press. Last of all is the KGB - in my twelve years of case officering I never saw or heard of a situation in which the KGB attacked or obstructed a CIA operation.{16} Stockwell adds that the various intelligence services do not want their world to be "complicated" by murdering each other. It isn't done. If a CIA case officer has a flat tire in the dark of night on a lonely road, he will not hesitate to accept a ride from a KGB officer - likely the two would detour to some bar for a drink together. In fact CIA and KGB officers entertain each other frequently in their homes. The CIA's files are full of mention of such relationships in almost every African station.{17} Proponents of "fighting fire with fire" come perilously close at times to arguing that if the KGB, for example, had a hand in the overthrow of the Czechoslovak government in 1968, it is OK for the CIA to have a hand in the overthrow of the Chilean government in 1973. It's as if the destruction of democracy by the KGB deposits funds in a bank account from which the CIA is then justified in making withdrawals. What then has been the thread common to the diverse targets of American intervention which has brought down upon them the wrath, and often the firepower, of the world's most powerful nation? In virtually every case involving the Third World described in this book, it has been, in one form or another, a policy of "self-determination": the desire, born of perceived need and principle, to pursue a path of development independent of US foreign policy objectives. Most commonly, this has been manifested in (a) the ambition to free themselves from economic and political subservience to the United States; (b) the refusal to minimize relations with the socialist bloc, or suppress the left at home, or welcome an American military installation on their soil; in short, a refusal to be a pawn in the cold war; or (c) the attempt to alter or replace a government which held to neither of these aspirations. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that such a policy of independence has been viewed and expressed by numerous Third World leaders and revolutionaries as one not to be equated by definition to anti-Americanism or pro-communism, but as simply a determination to maintain a position of neutrality and non-alignment vis-a-vis the two superpowers. Time and time again, however, it will be seen that the United States was not prepared to live with this proposition. Arbenz of Guatemala, Mossadegh of Iran, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nkrumah of Ghana, Jagan of British Guiana, Sihanouk of Cambodia ... all, insisted Uncle Sam, must declare themselves unequivocally on the side of "The Free World" or suffer the consequences. Nkrumah put the case for non-alignment as follows: The experiment which we tried in Ghana was essentially one of developing the country in co-operation with the world as a whole. Non-alignment meant exactly what it said. We were not hostile to the countries of the socialist world in the way in which the governments of the old colonial territories were. It should be remembered that while Britain pursued at home co-existence with the Soviet Union this was never allowed to extend to British colonial territories. Books on socialism, which were published and circulated freely in Britain, were banned in the British colonial empire, and after Ghana became independent it was assumed abroad that it would continue to follow the same restrictive ideological approach. When we behaved as did the British in their relations with the socialist countries we were accused of being pro-Russian and introducing the most dangerous ideas into Africa.{18} It is reminiscent of the 19th-century American South, where many Southerners were deeply offended that so many of their black slaves had deserted to the Northern side in the Civil War. They had genuinely thought that the blacks should have been grateful for all their white masters had done for them, and that they were happy and content with their lot. A Southern physician, Samuel Cartwright, argued that many of the slaves suffered from a form of mental illness, which he called "drapetomania", diagnosed as the uncontrollable urge to escape from slavery. In the second half of the 20th-century, this illness, in the Third World, has usually been called "communism". When Washington officials equate nationalism or self-determination with "communism", there are times when they are "correct". At other times, they are "wrong". It doesn't particularly matter, for in either case they are referring to the same phenomenon. Although, in this book, the Soviet Union, China, various communist parties, etc., are sometimes referred to as "communist", this is primarily a shorthand convenience and a bow to custom, and is not meant to infer a political ideology or practice necessarily different in any way from those governments or parties not referred to as communist. Emphasis is placed upon what these bodies have actually done, not upon reference to what Marx or Lenin wrote. Perhaps the most deeply ingrained reflex of knee-jerk anti-communism is the belief that the Soviet Union (or Cuba or Vietnam, etc., acting as Moscow's surrogate) is a clandestine force lurking behind the facade of self-determination, stirring up the hydra of revolution, or just plain trouble, here, there, and everywhere; yet another incarnation, although on a far grander scale, of the proverbial "outside agitator", he who has made his appearance regularly throughout history ... King George blamed the French for inciting the American colonies to revolt ... disillusioned American farmers and veterans protesting their onerous economic circumstances after the revolution (Shays' Rebellion) were branded as British agents out to wreck the new republic ... labor strikes in late-19th-century America were blamed on "anarchists" and "foreigners", during the First World War on "German agents", after the war on "Bolsheviks". And in the 1960s, said the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, J. Edgar Hoover "helped spread the view among the police ranks that any kind of mass protest is due to a conspiracy promulgated by agitators, often Communists, `who misdirect otherwise contented people'."{19} The last is the key phrase, one which encapsulates the conspiracy mentality of those in power - the idea that no people, except those living under the enemy, could be so miserable and discontent as to need recourse to revolution or even mass protest; that it is only the agitation of the outsider which misdirects them along this path. Accordingly, if Ronald Reagan were to concede that the masses of El Salvador have every good reason to rise up against their god-awful existence, it would bring into question his accusation, and the rationale for US intervention, that it is principally (only?) the Soviet Union and its Cuban and Nicaraguan allies who instigate the Salvadoreans: that seemingly magical power of communists everywhere who, with a twist of their red wrist, can transform peaceful, happy people into furious guerrillas. The CIA knows how difficult a feat this is. The Agency, as we shall see, tried to spark mass revolt in China, Albania, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe with a singular lack of success. The Agency's scribes have laid the blame for these failures on the "closed" nature of the societies involved. But in non-communist countries, the CIA has had to resort to military coups or extra-legal chicanery to get its people into power. It has never been able to light the fire of popular revolution. For Washington to concede merit and virtue to a particular Third World insurgency would, moreover, raise the question: Why does not the United States, if it must intervene, take the side of the rebels? Not only might this better serve the cause of human rights and justice, but it would shut out the Russians from their alleged role. What better way to frustrate the International Communist Conspiracy? But this is a question that dares not speak its name in the Oval Office, a question that is relevant to many of the cases in this book. Instead, the United States remains committed to its all-too-familiar policy of establishing and/or supporting the most vile tyrannies in the world, whose outrages against their own people confront us daily in the pages of our newspapers: brutal massacres; systematic, sophisticated torture; public whippings; soldiers and police firing into crowds; hunger, runaway unemployment, the homeless, the refugees, the tens of thousands of disappeared persons ... a way of life that is virtually a monopoly held by America's allies, from Guatemala, Chile and El Salvador to Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia, all members in good standing of the Holy War Against Communism, all members of "The Free World", that region of which we hear so much and see so little. The restrictions on civil liberties found in the communist bloc, as severe as they are, pale by comparison to the cottage-industry Auschwitzes of "The Free World", and, except in that curious mental landscape inhabited by The Compleat Anti-Communist, can have little or nothing to do with the sundry American interventions supposedly in the cause of a higher good. It is interesting to note that as commonplace as it is for American leaders to speak of freedom and democracy while supporting dictatorships, so do Russian leaders speak of wars of liberation, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism while doing extremely little to actually further these causes, American propaganda notwithstanding. The Soviets like to be thought of as champions of the Third World, but they have stood by doing little more than going "tsk, tsk" as progressive movements and governments, even Communist Parties, in Greece, Guatemala, British Guiana, Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere have gone to the wall with American complicity. During the early 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency instigated several military incursions into Communist China. In 1960, CIA planes, without any provocation, bombed the sovereign nation of Guatemala. In 1973, the Agency encouraged a bloody revolt against the government of Iraq. In the American mass media at the time, and therefore in the American mind, these events did not happen. "We didn't know what was happening", became a cliche used to ridicule those Germans who claimed ignorance of the events which took place under the Nazis. Yet, was their stock answer as far-fetched as we'd like to think? It is sobering to reflect that in our era of instant world-wide communications, the United States has, on many occasions, been able to mount a large- or small-scale military operation or undertake another, equally blatant, form of intervention without the American public being aware of it until years later, if ever. Often the only report of the event or of US involvement was a passing reference to the fact that a communist government had made certain charges - just the kind of "news" the American public has been well conditioned to dismiss out of hand, and the press not to follow up; as the German people were taught that reports from abroad of Nazi wrong-doings were no more than communist propaganda. With few exceptions, the interventions never made the headlines or the evening TV news. With some, bits and pieces of the stories have popped up here and there, but rarely brought together to form a cohesive and enlightening whole; the fragments usually appear long after the fact, quietly buried within other stories, just as quietly forgotten, bursting into the foreground only when extraordinary circumstances have compelled it, such as the Iranian hostage crisis which produced a rash of articles on the role played by the United States in the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953. It was as if editors had been spurred into thinking: "Hey, just what did we do in Iran to make all those people hate us so?" There have been a lot of Irans in America's recent past, but in the absence of the New York Daily News or the Los Angeles Times conspicuously grabbing the reader by the collar and pressing against his face the full implication of the deed ... in the absence of NBC putting it all into real pictures of real people on the receiving end ... in such absence the incidents become non-events for the large majority of Americans, and they can honestly say "We didn't know what was happening." Former Chinese Premier Chou En-lai once observed: "One of the delightful things about Americans is that they have absolutely no historical memory." It's probably even worse than he realized. During the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in Pennsylvania in 1979, a Japanese journalist, Atsuo Kaneko of the Japanese Kyoto News Service, spent several hours interviewing people temporarily housed at a hockey rink - mostly children, pregnant women and young mothers. He discovered that none of them had heard of Hiroshima. Mention of the name drew a blank.{20} And in 1982, a judge in Oakland, California said he was appalled when some 50 prospective jurors for a death-penalty murder trial were questioned and "none of them knew who Hitler was".{21} To the foreign policy oligarchy in Washington, it is more than delightful. It is sine qua non. So obscured is the comprehensive record of American interventions that when, in 1975, the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress was asked to undertake a study of covert activities of the CIA to date, it was able to come up with but a very minor portion of the overseas incidents presented in this book for the same period.{22} Yet, all the information is there for the reading. I have not had access to the secret archives of the CIA or other government agencies. The details of the interventions have been gathered from books, newspapers, periodicals, and US Government publications freely available in one library or another. But for all that has made its way into popular consciousness, or into school texts, encyclopedias, or other standard reference works, there might as well exist strict censorship in the United States. The reader is invited to look through the relevant sections of the three principal American encyclopedias, Americana, Britannica, and Colliers, after completing this book. The image of encyclopedias as the final repository of objective knowledge takes a beating. What is tantamount to a non-recognition of American interventions may very well be due to these esteemed works employing a criterion similar to that of Washington officials as reflected in the Pentagon Papers. The New York Times summarized this highly interesting phenomenon thusly: Clandestine warfare against North Vietnam, for example, is not seen ... as violating the Geneva Accords of 1954, which ended the French Indochina War, or as conflicting with the public policy pronouncements of the various administrations. Clandestine warfare, because it is covert, does not exist as far as treaties and public posture are concerned. Further, secret commitments to other nations are not sensed as infringing on the treaty-making powers of the Senate, because they are not publicly acknowledged.{23} The de facto censorship which leaves so many Americans functionally illiterate about the history of US foreign affairs may be all the more effective because it is not official, heavy-handed or conspiratorial, but woven artlessly into the fabric of education and media. No conspiracy is needed. The editors of Reader's Digest and U.S. News and World Report do not need to meet covertly with the man from NBC in an FBI safe-house to plan next month's stories and programs; for the simple truth is that these men would not have reached the positions they occupy if they themselves had not all been guided through the same tunnel of camouflaged history and emerged with the same selective memory and conventional wisdom. As extensive as the historical record presented here is, it is by no means meant to be a complete catalogue of every instance and every kind of American intervention since the Second World War. We are, after all, dealing largely with events which were covert when they occurred and which, for the most part, remain officially classified. Moreover, with but a few exceptions, this study does not concern itself with espionage or counter-espionage other than in passing. These areas have been well documented in countless "spy" books. Generally speaking, the study is confined to the more significant or blatant cases of intervention: the use of armed aggression by American and/or native troops acting with the United States; an operation, successful or not, to overthrow a government; an attempt to suppress a popular rebellion or movement; an attempted assassination of a political leader; gross interference in an election, or other flagrant manipulation of a country's political or economic system. To serve these ends, the CIA over the years has made use of an extraordinary arsenal of weapons. Because of space considerations and to avoid excess repetition, only selected examples are given here and there amongst the cases. In actuality, at least one, and usually more, of these tactics was brought to bear in virtually every instance. Principal among them are the following: 1) CIA schools: in the United States and Latin America, where many tens of thousands of Third World military and police personnel have been taught modern methods of controlling insurgency and "subversion"; instruction includes techniques of "interrogation" (often a euphemism for torture); members of the labor movement learn the how and why of organizing workers within a framework of free enterprise and anti-communism. 2) Infiltration and manipulation of selected groups: political parties, women's organizations, professional, youth and cultural associations, etc., for electoral and propaganda purposes; the creation of unions - local, regional, national and international - set up to counterpoise and weaken existing labor groups too closely oriented towards social change and the left. 3) News manipulation: the "hiring" of foreign editors, columnists and journalists ... "I guess I've bought as much newspaper space as the A & P," chortled a former CIA officer one day{24}; the creation and/or subsidizing of numerous periodicals, news services, radio stations, books, and book publishers. Considering all assets, the CIA, at least until the late 1970s, has run what probably amounts to the largest news organization in the world; its propaganda and disinformation effect is routinely multiplied by world-wide replay. 4) Economic means: in concert with other US government agencies, such as AID, private American corporations, and international lending institutions, the methods of manipulating and applying pressure to selected sectors of a country's economy, or the economy as a whole, are without number. 5) Dirty tricks department: bugging, wire-tapping, forged documents, bogus personal letters, planting of evidence, spreading rumors, blackmail, etc., etc., to create incidents or obtain information to embarrass the left, locally and internationally, particularly to lend credence to charges of a Moscow or Havana conspiracy; to provoke the expulsion of communist-bloc diplomats or the breaking of relations with those countries; to foster distrust and dissension within the left. Although the cases which follow are presented as more or less discrete stories, fixed in time and with beginnings and ends, this is done mainly to keep the information within manageable bounds and to highlight the more dramatic turns of events, and is not meant to indicate that there was no significant CIA activity in the particular country before or after the years specified. The reader should therefore keep in mind that the above types of operation as well as others are all ongoing programs, carried out routinely in numerous countries, including many not listed in this book. This is the Agency's "job", what its officers do for a living. "The upheaval in China is a revolution which, if we analyze it, we will see is prompted by the same things that prompted the British, French and American revolutions." {25} A cosmopolitan and generous sentiment of Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, later Secretary of State. At precisely the same time as Mr. Rusk's talk in 1950, others in his government were actively plotting the downfall of the Chinese revolutionary government. This has been a common phenomenon. For many of the cases described in the following pages, one can find statements of high or middle-level Washington officials which put into question the policy of intervention; which expressed misgivings based either on principle (sometimes the better side of American liberalism) or concern that the intervention would not serve any worthwhile end, might even result in disaster. I have attached little weight to such dissenting statements as, indeed, in the final analysis, did Washington decision-makers who, in controversial world situations, could be relied upon to play the anti-communist card. In presenting the interventions in this manner, I am declaring that American foreign policy is what American foreign policy does. Though I am clearly opposed to the American interventions on both political and moral grounds, I have striven to not let this color my selection of facts; to not fall prey to that familiar failing: choosing one's facts to fit one's thesis. Which is to say, I have not knowingly omitted any facts which contradict in any significant way the information I have presented, or the implications of that information. Further, I have chosen not to take into account a number of intriguing disclosures concerning American interventions where I felt that the source could not be sufficiently trusted and/or the information was not presented or documented in a manner which made it credible to me. In any event, it is not demanded of the reader that he accept my biases, but that he reflect upon his own{26} INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGINAL EDITION - NOTES 1. Washington Post, 24 October 1965, article by Stanley Karnow. 2. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1951), p. 428. 3. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London, 1929), p. 235. 4. D.F. Fleming, "The Western Intervention in the Soviet Union, 1918-1920", New World Review (New York), Fall 1967; see also Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960 (New York, 1961), pp. 16-35. 5. Los Angeles Times, 2 September 1991, p. 1. 6. Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1928), p. 125. 7. Ibid., p. 154. 8. San Francisco Chronicle, 4 October 1978, p. 4. 9. New Republic, 4 August 1920, a 42-page analysis by Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz. 10. Life, 29 March 1943, p. 29. 11. New York Times, 24 June 1941; for an interesting account of how US officials laid the groundwork for the cold war during and immediately after World War 2, see the first two chapters of Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (New York, 1981), a study of previously classified papers at the Eisenhower Library. 12. This has been well documented and would be "common knowledge" if not for its shameful implications. See, e.g., the British Cabinet papers for 1939, summarized in the Washington Post, 2 January 1970 (reprinted from the Manchester Guardian); also Fleming, The Cold War, pp. 48-97. 13. Los Angeles Times, 15 December 1987; the figure of 28% disagreeing was obtained by the author from the Times reporter. For a highly insightful and readable description of the anti-communist mentality in the United States, see Michael Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse (Random House, New York, 1969). 14. Related by former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in a recorded interview for the Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Library; cited in Roger Morgan, The United States and West Germany, 1945-1973: A Study in Alliance Politics (Oxford University Press, London, 1974), p. 54, my translation from the French. 15. Parenti, p. 35. 16. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York, 1978), p. 101. The expressions "CIA officer" or "case officer" are used throughout the present book to denote regular, full-time, career employees of the Agency, as opposed to "agent", someone working for the CIA on an ad hoc basis. Other sources which are quoted, it will be seen, tend to use the word "agent" to cover both categories. 17. Ibid., p. 238. 18. Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London, 1968), pp. 71-2. 19. The full quotation is from the New York Times, 11 January 1969, p. 1; the inside quotation is that of the National Commission. 20. Mother Jones magazine (San Francisco), April 1981, p. 5. 21. San Francisco Chronicle, 14 January 1982, p. 2. 22. Richard F. Grimmett, "Reported Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency: 1950-1974" (Library of Congress report) 18 February 1975. 23. The Pentagon Papers (N.Y. Times edition, 1971), p. xiii. 24. Newsweek, 22 November 1971, p. 37. 25. Speech before the World Affairs Council at the University of Pennsylvania, 13 January 1950, cited in the Republican Congressional Committee Newsletter, 20 September 1965. 26. The last sentence is borrowed from Michael Parenti, op. cit., p. 7. Taken from Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II; by William Blum email:bblum6 [at] aol.com --------7 of 8-------- Clinton & 'Bama: their mouths runneth over but their feet moveth not --------8 of 8-------- ------------------- FotherMucker Bush ------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - David Shove shove001 [at] tc.umn.edu rhymes with clove Progressive Calendar over 2225 subscribers as of 12.19.02 please send all messages in plain text no attachments To GO DIRECTLY to an item, eg --------8 of x-------- do a find on --8 impeach bush & cheney impeach bush & cheney impeach bush & cheney impeach bush & cheney
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